1. Let us now discuss ‘Transatlantic Insecurity’.
Let’s be clear that Washington has become a source of enormous insecurity for the European Union. Tariffs, Ukraine, Greenland and disinformation on Twitter ahead of the upcoming German elections are areas where the Trump administration’s political preferences are in total collision with the survival of the Union. Let us take advantage of recent events to build consensus among Member States that the US has left and will not return, that it is no longer ‘family’, as was always said, and that it has even degraded its status from “partner with whom we can collaborate according to the merits of each initiative‘ to ’source of instability”. Any of the four events mentioned above (tariffs, Ukraine, Greenland and disinformation) pose very serious security crises for the Union. Generating consensus, a shared worldview among Member States, is critical,
as it will accelerate the imminent decisions we must make, whether in terms of increasing defence spending, the Competitiveness Compass, or any other area of our unity of action as Europeans. The above, of course, while maintaining the diplomatic and non-belligerent language that suits us, as we prefer it to be the Trump administration that triggers the transatlantic relationship. Furthermore, given that the anti-European forces are Trumpist in their narrative, letting the Trump administration act first benefits us in cornering them.
2. New countries in Europe: Western Ukraine and Eastern Ukraine.
As painful as it may be, let us recognise that the most likely scenario for Ukraine in the short term is a de facto partition of the country between an eastern zone, which will remain under Russian influence, and a western zone, which we will presumably bring closer to the Union. The exact form of this partition (temporary ceasefire, peace agreement) are legal details that, in my opinion, are not politically relevant. What is relevant is to understand that a situation over the coming decades in which Ukraine, as a country bordering the European Single Market and Russia, is divided is the most likely scenario, as the balance of power in the area and the willingness to engage militarily¹ favours Russia. Given that our absolute interest in terms of security and defence is to decouple ourselves from Russia, the EU has every incentive and every interest in consolidating and cementing the existence and survival of this new Western Ukraine. That is where we must direct our most immediate efforts.
1 Let us recall Clausewitz: ‘Strength = Capabilities x Will to Fight’.
3. The US and Moscow have not only discussed Ukraine, but also the Arctic and, predictably, Greenland.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio said after yesterday’s meeting in Riyadh that “peace in Ukraine‘ opened the door to ’incredible opportunities to partner with the Russians geopolitically on issues of common interest and economically on issues that we hope will be good for the world.” On the other hand, the President of the Russian Sovereign Fund, Kirill Dmitriev, curiously also present in Riyadh, confirmed that ‘we specifically discussed the Arctic.’ Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that they also discussed Greenland. Russia and the US are not only negotiating an end to the conflict in Ukraine, they are also dividing up areas of influence in other geographies. Are there any other actors who are interested in these developments, who have not yet taken note and who can help us in our goal of being present in these negotiations?
4. Let us urgently notify China.
Let us engage in international politics: there is no longer just one great power, but two. Let us inform China that, behind its back, the United States is negotiating with Russia to divide up the Arctic in a re-run of the 1885 Congress of Berlin, where Africa was divided up. During the war in Ukraine, Washington has pushed us to break off relations with China, arguing – and sometimes exaggerating – that Beijing was directly helping Moscow in the conflict in Ukraine. Let us transfer that argument and that political dynamic between the two great powers (in which they use Europe as a battering ram against each other) to our European case and our interest in being part of that negotiation. “If we are talking about the Arctic and other global issues, shouldn’t China also be involved?” could be our candid question to Beijing.
China issued a press release on Monday supporting the EU’s presence in Riyadh. And as a superpower competing with the US, it cannot allow such a strategic issue as the Arctic to be discussed without its participation. It is therefore suggested that the EU Member States present in Paris be urged to contact the Chinese ambassadors in their respective capitals to inform them that Moscow and Washington are negotiating behind their backs not only on Ukraine but also on other issues that are vital to the Asian power. Furthermore, there is already a precedent for this type of political coordination in the EU: after the summit at the Élysée Palace in May 2022, and under strong pressure from the US, all Member States contacted the Chinese delegations in their respective countries to ask them to reduce their support for Moscow. In short, let’s engage in international politics and mobilise the major player that is not present and whose interests in this matter (not allowing the Arctic to be discussed without its involvement) produce a result that is in our interest (more voices at the table on Ukraine).
5. Let us not fall into nostalgia for perfection.
‘Brussels is absent,’ ‘the Member States are uncoordinated,’ ‘there is no common front’ are phrases that dominate the press. I believe this is an exaggerated victimisation that has more to do with the current situation in the EU than with the reality of the facts. For example, on trade issues, Brussels is following the appropriate process: not inflaming the rhetoric, thinking about calculated responses, seeking transactions that can appease Washington, and being aware of our strengths (e.g., the revenues of large US technology companies that come from the Single Market). On the other hand, in defence matters, differences of opinion are normal on such a critical issue, which, in the history of the creation of states, is the last hurdle to be overcome. Furthermore, it could be said that even the differences on this issue are beginning to be very surmountable: at the economic level, it is a matter of nuances and final agreement on the source of the new funds needed; at the level of military intervention and putting troops on the ground, there is still some time to address this issue, and historically we have underestimated the change in citizens’ political preferences on this highly controversial issue².
Finally, and once again, to contain Russia at our border, we do not need the latest US military technology: we do not need sixth-generation fighter jets or 2-nanometre microprocessors. With a little more coordination, a larger budget and careful deployment of troops if necessary, this will be sufficient to achieve our main objective: to stabilise Western Ukraine and serve as a buffer between Russia and the Single Market.
Let us not allow our spirits to falter or underestimate our capabilities when the political contest is only just beginning. We have internal assets (which the US wants and which are sufficient to resolve the imminent EU security crisis on our eastern border) and external relations (with China) that we can capitalise on at this time.
1 Let us recall the neutral Sweden, lover of multilateralism and pacifist social tendencies, of January 2022, and the Stockholm that barely a month later requested membership in NATO.
6. We project more power than we think we have.
The main difficulty in international relations is correctly gauging the balance of power: there are too many variables (military, economic, technological, distances between areas of operation) and it is sometimes difficult to measure where one stands in relation to the rest. I believe that something similar is happening to the EU. So let us ask ourselves the following question: why has the US singled out tariffs with Canada, Mexico, Colombia and Japan, but has not done so directly with the EU, instead using ‘global tariffs’ (steel and aluminium, for example) or generic statements of ‘reciprocity’ (without directly mentioning VAT)? Or why did Meta, Google and other technology companies close to the US administration complain at the Munich forum itself to Bloomberg correspondents about the causes and fines pending for breaches of the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act in the EU? One could conclude that the Trump administration and its entourage are more hurt by this issue than they would like to admit. However, the EU media only focuses on tariffs and our military weakness. We must escape this trap and link issues in a broader conversation: Ukraine, Greenland and the Arctic, and whether or not US digital services have access to the EU are issues that interest us; the Arctic interests China. Let us look for ways to broaden the forum of topics and participants by leveraging the pain points that we know the Trump Administration has.
That is why it is so important for all Member States to begin to perceive the United States for what it is: a source of insecurity to which we must respond with our strength in all dimensions, as stated in the first point of this decalogue. If we focus only on our military insufficiency, we give Washington a space for political dialogue in which it feels much stronger. If we link and cross issues beyond the military and Ukraine, political negotiation is not entirely skewed towards Washington.
If we link and cross issues beyond the military and Ukraine, political negotiation is not entirely skewed towards Washington. It is true that the balance of power is not in our favour and that we are starting from further behind (as we do not have joint military capabilities), but let us not give up ground when the game has only just begun.
7. Let us accelerate our geopolitical roadmap.
As a medium-sized power with some important geopolitical assets (our Single Market, our political support or lack thereof for one or another major power on issues that interest each of them) amid the competition between Washington and Beijing, Brussels’ roadmap in recent years is the right one: rearm internally (reindustrialisation, competitiveness, decoupling, energy independence), balance with other international actors (whether through rapprochement with China or opening up to the Global South) and maintaining a cautious but assertive and pragmatic discourse. Let us not stray from this path and let us take advantage of the political energy that will be released (by a security crisis prompted by Washington in the form of the partition of Ukraine) both to accelerate this roadmap and to counter the anti-European Trumpist forces.
8. Let us completely decouple from Russia.
The rise of renewables in our energy system and the emergence, deployment and consolidation of green hydrogen will allow us, in the medium term, with a little luck and a significant effort in the form of subsidies and debt, to end our dependence on other countries for one of the critical elements of our societies and economies: energy. All we need is a ‘little’ time (5-10 years) and a ‘little’ investment (another NextGen package, roughly speaking). Resuming relations with Moscow and buying natural gas again is not in line with the interests of the Member States bordering Russia (the Baltic republics, Poland, Sweden and Finland, directly) or with the interests of countries like ours (with economic growth linked to the autonomous European supply of renewable energy) or with those of the European Union as a whole in the medium term (as we want to and it is technologically possible to be self-sufficient in less than a decade).
The only stumbling block is German industry and its decline due to the high energy prices it faces. But this is relatively ‘easy’ to solve by ‘simply’ subsidising the sector and the development of green H2 for a decade. Let us be aware of the financial difficulty of this challenge, but let us look at the new space for a European agreement on debt: Member States seeking European defence spending via Eurobonds (Spain, France, Italy, Germany, etc.). Let us be aware of the financial difficulty of this challenge, but let us also look at the new space for a European agreement on debt: Member States seeking European defence spending via Eurobonds (Spain, countries bordering Russia) and Member States that need to subsidise their economic sectors during the energy transition period. This is an ideal moment for a ‘grand agreement’ on defence and energy, for which we do not need to alter our agenda of degasification from Russia.
9. Small, consistent steps towards a Defence Union
Although it is a controversial issue and one on which there is no definitive conclusion in political science, the creation of a free and sovereign state ultimately leads to a defence union, which ‘usually’ occurs in the face of an external existential threat. One example would be the founding of Germany in 1870-1871 in response to Napoleon III’s declaration of war on France. Another example would be the creation of the Union in the United States between Another example would be the creation of the Union in the United States between independence in 1789 and its Constitution in 1793, with the double threat of the British to the north and indigenous tribes to the south and west.
The creation of a state tends to be mythologised, and the course of events reaches us today in a distorted form. They probably felt like moments of great polarisation and a lot of political noise. I believe this is the case with the EU and that the Trump Presidency, if it continues with the four sources of insecurity described above (Ukraine, Greenland, tariffs and threats to European democracy), will generate a space of political energy that the EU can capitalise on in that direction.
Thus, there is no need to square the circle today on the Defence Union: let us propose incremental steps, actions that benefit all Member States (talking about defence as a ‘European public good’), let us jointly finance projects that strengthen our borders (both eastern and western, as well as our cyberspace), let us ensure that Ukraine is stabilised once the US ceases its support, and let us wait with a cool head for the borders (both eastern and western, as well as our cyberspace), let us ensure that we stabilise Ukraine once the US ceases its support, and let us wait calmly for events to unfold (as Trump will give us an excuse and create a European sentiment that will allow us to face more complex military and political decisions).
10. Europe needs its sphere of influence
However antithetical it may be to the founding principles of the EU, any self-respecting power wants to ensure that its neighbourhood is peaceful, or that it has the greatest influence over the states with which it shares a border. The border with Russia, the Balkans, the south-eastern Mediterranean arc and the Sahel are areas where Brussels and the Member States must feel that they have sufficient leverage to ensure the normal functioning of the heart of the EU, which is the Single Market. No beating about the bush.
11. EXTRA: There is political space for a Grand European Agreement
The Baltic republics, Poland, Finland, Sweden and Romania coexist with a military power in their vicinity that threatens their survival and are calling for joint investment in defence. ‘Frugal’ Denmark fears losing Greenland and could perhaps trade a consolidation of European solidarity on security and defence (development of Article 42.7 of the TFEU) for its participation in another joint debt package. Germany needs to revive its economy and would be sensitive to reductions in energy expenditure or subsidies to its industries as they transition away from gas. Italy, which currently has a Prime Minister close to the Trump administration, has the rest of the European Single Market as its main trading and financial partner and also belongs to the eurozone. Southern countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece have their own security considerations regarding immigration and instability in the Sahel (and in a Morocco emboldened by the Trump administration, in our case). And all Member States have in common that their economic survival depends on the economic survival of the Single Market. Although with different nuances, the above better describes a ‘symmetrical’ rather than an ‘asymmetrical’ shock, to repeat the language used by economists during the Euro crisis.
At first glance, this tangle of interests seems complex. From a bird’s eye view, however, it is the perfect breeding ground for a Great European Agreement: financing common defence throughout the EU’s sphere of influence (east, south, Mediterranean), strengthening our borders and transitioning towards energy independence for the entire bloc.
After all, there is no crisis without opportunity.
Emergency Decalogue for the EU: next steps following the meeting between the US and Russia in Riyadh
Content INDEX
Ideas for breaking the current deadlock in the Union's discourse
Critical security and defence developments for the European Union and its Member States have unfolded rapidly over the last two weeks, from Trump’s first round of tariffs to yesterday’s meeting between Moscow and Washington in Riyadh on Tuesday 18 February, not to mention Vice-President Vance’s disastrous statements in Munich. There is a certain unease among European analysts and on the front pages of the media, as well as a great deal of uncertainty about how Europe can and should respond. Mario Draghi himself, in his speech yesterday at the European Parliament, said, ‘You ask me what is best to do… I do not know, but we need to do something.’ Thus, with the aim of shedding light on the next steps to be taken by Europe, a list of ten actions and approaches to break our discursive paralysis is provided below, followed by a detailed explanation of each one.
Emergency Decalogue for the EU: next steps
And an extra:
1. Let us now discuss ‘Transatlantic Insecurity’.
Let’s be clear that Washington has become a source of enormous insecurity for the European Union. Tariffs, Ukraine, Greenland and disinformation on Twitter ahead of the upcoming German elections are areas where the Trump administration’s political preferences are in total collision with the survival of the Union. Let us take advantage of recent events to build consensus among Member States that the US has left and will not return, that it is no longer ‘family’, as was always said, and that it has even degraded its status from “partner with whom we can collaborate according to the merits of each initiative‘ to ’source of instability”. Any of the four events mentioned above (tariffs, Ukraine, Greenland and disinformation) pose very serious security crises for the Union. Generating consensus, a shared worldview among Member States, is critical,
as it will accelerate the imminent decisions we must make, whether in terms of increasing defence spending, the Competitiveness Compass, or any other area of our unity of action as Europeans. The above, of course, while maintaining the diplomatic and non-belligerent language that suits us, as we prefer it to be the Trump administration that triggers the transatlantic relationship. Furthermore, given that the anti-European forces are Trumpist in their narrative, letting the Trump administration act first benefits us in cornering them.
2. New countries in Europe: Western Ukraine and Eastern Ukraine.
As painful as it may be, let us recognise that the most likely scenario for Ukraine in the short term is a de facto partition of the country between an eastern zone, which will remain under Russian influence, and a western zone, which we will presumably bring closer to the Union. The exact form of this partition (temporary ceasefire, peace agreement) are legal details that, in my opinion, are not politically relevant. What is relevant is to understand that a situation over the coming decades in which Ukraine, as a country bordering the European Single Market and Russia, is divided is the most likely scenario, as the balance of power in the area and the willingness to engage militarily¹ favours Russia. Given that our absolute interest in terms of security and defence is to decouple ourselves from Russia, the EU has every incentive and every interest in consolidating and cementing the existence and survival of this new Western Ukraine. That is where we must direct our most immediate efforts.
1 Let us recall Clausewitz: ‘Strength = Capabilities x Will to Fight’.
3. The US and Moscow have not only discussed Ukraine, but also the Arctic and, predictably, Greenland.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio said after yesterday’s meeting in Riyadh that “peace in Ukraine‘ opened the door to ’incredible opportunities to partner with the Russians geopolitically on issues of common interest and economically on issues that we hope will be good for the world.” On the other hand, the President of the Russian Sovereign Fund, Kirill Dmitriev, curiously also present in Riyadh, confirmed that ‘we specifically discussed the Arctic.’ Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that they also discussed Greenland. Russia and the US are not only negotiating an end to the conflict in Ukraine, they are also dividing up areas of influence in other geographies. Are there any other actors who are interested in these developments, who have not yet taken note and who can help us in our goal of being present in these negotiations?
4. Let us urgently notify China.
Let us engage in international politics: there is no longer just one great power, but two. Let us inform China that, behind its back, the United States is negotiating with Russia to divide up the Arctic in a re-run of the 1885 Congress of Berlin, where Africa was divided up. During the war in Ukraine, Washington has pushed us to break off relations with China, arguing – and sometimes exaggerating – that Beijing was directly helping Moscow in the conflict in Ukraine. Let us transfer that argument and that political dynamic between the two great powers (in which they use Europe as a battering ram against each other) to our European case and our interest in being part of that negotiation. “If we are talking about the Arctic and other global issues, shouldn’t China also be involved?” could be our candid question to Beijing.
China issued a press release on Monday supporting the EU’s presence in Riyadh. And as a superpower competing with the US, it cannot allow such a strategic issue as the Arctic to be discussed without its participation. It is therefore suggested that the EU Member States present in Paris be urged to contact the Chinese ambassadors in their respective capitals to inform them that Moscow and Washington are negotiating behind their backs not only on Ukraine but also on other issues that are vital to the Asian power. Furthermore, there is already a precedent for this type of political coordination in the EU: after the summit at the Élysée Palace in May 2022, and under strong pressure from the US, all Member States contacted the Chinese delegations in their respective countries to ask them to reduce their support for Moscow. In short, let’s engage in international politics and mobilise the major player that is not present and whose interests in this matter (not allowing the Arctic to be discussed without its involvement) produce a result that is in our interest (more voices at the table on Ukraine).
5. Let us not fall into nostalgia for perfection.
‘Brussels is absent,’ ‘the Member States are uncoordinated,’ ‘there is no common front’ are phrases that dominate the press. I believe this is an exaggerated victimisation that has more to do with the current situation in the EU than with the reality of the facts. For example, on trade issues, Brussels is following the appropriate process: not inflaming the rhetoric, thinking about calculated responses, seeking transactions that can appease Washington, and being aware of our strengths (e.g., the revenues of large US technology companies that come from the Single Market). On the other hand, in defence matters, differences of opinion are normal on such a critical issue, which, in the history of the creation of states, is the last hurdle to be overcome. Furthermore, it could be said that even the differences on this issue are beginning to be very surmountable: at the economic level, it is a matter of nuances and final agreement on the source of the new funds needed; at the level of military intervention and putting troops on the ground, there is still some time to address this issue, and historically we have underestimated the change in citizens’ political preferences on this highly controversial issue².
Finally, and once again, to contain Russia at our border, we do not need the latest US military technology: we do not need sixth-generation fighter jets or 2-nanometre microprocessors. With a little more coordination, a larger budget and careful deployment of troops if necessary, this will be sufficient to achieve our main objective: to stabilise Western Ukraine and serve as a buffer between Russia and the Single Market.
Let us not allow our spirits to falter or underestimate our capabilities when the political contest is only just beginning. We have internal assets (which the US wants and which are sufficient to resolve the imminent EU security crisis on our eastern border) and external relations (with China) that we can capitalise on at this time.
1 Let us recall the neutral Sweden, lover of multilateralism and pacifist social tendencies, of January 2022, and the Stockholm that barely a month later requested membership in NATO.
6. We project more power than we think we have.
The main difficulty in international relations is correctly gauging the balance of power: there are too many variables (military, economic, technological, distances between areas of operation) and it is sometimes difficult to measure where one stands in relation to the rest. I believe that something similar is happening to the EU. So let us ask ourselves the following question: why has the US singled out tariffs with Canada, Mexico, Colombia and Japan, but has not done so directly with the EU, instead using ‘global tariffs’ (steel and aluminium, for example) or generic statements of ‘reciprocity’ (without directly mentioning VAT)? Or why did Meta, Google and other technology companies close to the US administration complain at the Munich forum itself to Bloomberg correspondents about the causes and fines pending for breaches of the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act in the EU? One could conclude that the Trump administration and its entourage are more hurt by this issue than they would like to admit. However, the EU media only focuses on tariffs and our military weakness. We must escape this trap and link issues in a broader conversation: Ukraine, Greenland and the Arctic, and whether or not US digital services have access to the EU are issues that interest us; the Arctic interests China. Let us look for ways to broaden the forum of topics and participants by leveraging the pain points that we know the Trump Administration has.
That is why it is so important for all Member States to begin to perceive the United States for what it is: a source of insecurity to which we must respond with our strength in all dimensions, as stated in the first point of this decalogue. If we focus only on our military insufficiency, we give Washington a space for political dialogue in which it feels much stronger. If we link and cross issues beyond the military and Ukraine, political negotiation is not entirely skewed towards Washington.
If we link and cross issues beyond the military and Ukraine, political negotiation is not entirely skewed towards Washington. It is true that the balance of power is not in our favour and that we are starting from further behind (as we do not have joint military capabilities), but let us not give up ground when the game has only just begun.
7. Let us accelerate our geopolitical roadmap.
As a medium-sized power with some important geopolitical assets (our Single Market, our political support or lack thereof for one or another major power on issues that interest each of them) amid the competition between Washington and Beijing, Brussels’ roadmap in recent years is the right one: rearm internally (reindustrialisation, competitiveness, decoupling, energy independence), balance with other international actors (whether through rapprochement with China or opening up to the Global South) and maintaining a cautious but assertive and pragmatic discourse. Let us not stray from this path and let us take advantage of the political energy that will be released (by a security crisis prompted by Washington in the form of the partition of Ukraine) both to accelerate this roadmap and to counter the anti-European Trumpist forces.
8. Let us completely decouple from Russia.
The rise of renewables in our energy system and the emergence, deployment and consolidation of green hydrogen will allow us, in the medium term, with a little luck and a significant effort in the form of subsidies and debt, to end our dependence on other countries for one of the critical elements of our societies and economies: energy. All we need is a ‘little’ time (5-10 years) and a ‘little’ investment (another NextGen package, roughly speaking). Resuming relations with Moscow and buying natural gas again is not in line with the interests of the Member States bordering Russia (the Baltic republics, Poland, Sweden and Finland, directly) or with the interests of countries like ours (with economic growth linked to the autonomous European supply of renewable energy) or with those of the European Union as a whole in the medium term (as we want to and it is technologically possible to be self-sufficient in less than a decade).
The only stumbling block is German industry and its decline due to the high energy prices it faces. But this is relatively ‘easy’ to solve by ‘simply’ subsidising the sector and the development of green H2 for a decade. Let us be aware of the financial difficulty of this challenge, but let us look at the new space for a European agreement on debt: Member States seeking European defence spending via Eurobonds (Spain, France, Italy, Germany, etc.). Let us be aware of the financial difficulty of this challenge, but let us also look at the new space for a European agreement on debt: Member States seeking European defence spending via Eurobonds (Spain, countries bordering Russia) and Member States that need to subsidise their economic sectors during the energy transition period. This is an ideal moment for a ‘grand agreement’ on defence and energy, for which we do not need to alter our agenda of degasification from Russia.
9. Small, consistent steps towards a Defence Union
Although it is a controversial issue and one on which there is no definitive conclusion in political science, the creation of a free and sovereign state ultimately leads to a defence union, which ‘usually’ occurs in the face of an external existential threat. One example would be the founding of Germany in 1870-1871 in response to Napoleon III’s declaration of war on France. Another example would be the creation of the Union in the United States between Another example would be the creation of the Union in the United States between independence in 1789 and its Constitution in 1793, with the double threat of the British to the north and indigenous tribes to the south and west.
The creation of a state tends to be mythologised, and the course of events reaches us today in a distorted form. They probably felt like moments of great polarisation and a lot of political noise. I believe this is the case with the EU and that the Trump Presidency, if it continues with the four sources of insecurity described above (Ukraine, Greenland, tariffs and threats to European democracy), will generate a space of political energy that the EU can capitalise on in that direction.
Thus, there is no need to square the circle today on the Defence Union: let us propose incremental steps, actions that benefit all Member States (talking about defence as a ‘European public good’), let us jointly finance projects that strengthen our borders (both eastern and western, as well as our cyberspace), let us ensure that Ukraine is stabilised once the US ceases its support, and let us wait with a cool head for the borders (both eastern and western, as well as our cyberspace), let us ensure that we stabilise Ukraine once the US ceases its support, and let us wait calmly for events to unfold (as Trump will give us an excuse and create a European sentiment that will allow us to face more complex military and political decisions).
10. Europe needs its sphere of influence
However antithetical it may be to the founding principles of the EU, any self-respecting power wants to ensure that its neighbourhood is peaceful, or that it has the greatest influence over the states with which it shares a border. The border with Russia, the Balkans, the south-eastern Mediterranean arc and the Sahel are areas where Brussels and the Member States must feel that they have sufficient leverage to ensure the normal functioning of the heart of the EU, which is the Single Market. No beating about the bush.
11. EXTRA: There is political space for a Grand European Agreement
The Baltic republics, Poland, Finland, Sweden and Romania coexist with a military power in their vicinity that threatens their survival and are calling for joint investment in defence. ‘Frugal’ Denmark fears losing Greenland and could perhaps trade a consolidation of European solidarity on security and defence (development of Article 42.7 of the TFEU) for its participation in another joint debt package. Germany needs to revive its economy and would be sensitive to reductions in energy expenditure or subsidies to its industries as they transition away from gas. Italy, which currently has a Prime Minister close to the Trump administration, has the rest of the European Single Market as its main trading and financial partner and also belongs to the eurozone. Southern countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece have their own security considerations regarding immigration and instability in the Sahel (and in a Morocco emboldened by the Trump administration, in our case). And all Member States have in common that their economic survival depends on the economic survival of the Single Market. Although with different nuances, the above better describes a ‘symmetrical’ rather than an ‘asymmetrical’ shock, to repeat the language used by economists during the Euro crisis.
At first glance, this tangle of interests seems complex. From a bird’s eye view, however, it is the perfect breeding ground for a Great European Agreement: financing common defence throughout the EU’s sphere of influence (east, south, Mediterranean), strengthening our borders and transitioning towards energy independence for the entire bloc.
After all, there is no crisis without opportunity.